Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (N.D.Cal.)--Part 3; Oral Argument Before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

 

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I have been following the course of the political battle between the Givernor of California and the President of the United States over the rules and limits of Presidential authority, including rules relating to Presidential exercises of discretion and the bases for that exercise, around decisions to deploy military force within the United States. 

Having stayed the issuance of the district court's temporary restraining order issued against the President, the Court of Appeals heard argument on 17 June 2025. In excellent reporting for Politico, Appeals court seems poised to side with Trump on National Guard deployment in LA: A panel of two Trump appointees and one Biden appointee was openly skeptical of Gov. Gavin Newsom’s legal challenge, Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein nicely summarized the arguments. Their reporting may be accessed online HERE and is reproduced below.  More reporting here, here, and here.

The central issues--the scope of discretion and the reasonableness of the basis for its exercise appeared to be center stage. The further development of these concepts will have an effect well beyond the state of civil unrest in Los Angeles.  

 Access 

Part 1: Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California) Filed 10 June 2025--Part I

Part 2:  Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (N.D.Cal.)--Part 2; Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order; Order Granting Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order; Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for Stay Pending Appeal; Order Granting Emergency Motion

Part 3: Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (N.D.Cal.)--Part 3; Oral Argument Before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

"G7 Leaders’ statement on recent developments between Israel and Iran": Agit-Prop Communications and the Banalities of its Performance in Theaters of the Absurd

 

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I have been speaking to the way the global political elite, and their supporting claques, have become-- perhaps because of the environment in which it finds incentives and rewards, perhaps because it appears to be the surest road to managerial stability of populations that need curation for optimal behavior--they have merged with, the forms and attitudes of agit-prop that, once an instrument of revolutionary challenge to an established order, has become the manifestation of both order and its challenge in a manged way. (See here, here, here, here, here, and here). Agit prop does not "belong" to or as a manifestation of any specific system--it is as at home in Marxist-Leninist systems as it is in liberal democratic, theocratic, post-colonial, or techno-bureaucratic systems. Cultural and operational manifestations of communication tend to be trans-cultural, feeding of of its manifestations across systems in a sort of dialectics of action that then serves as the pathways for communication, meaning and management of subject populations--at least in the thought-actions of those with a hand at the controls of the management of human aggregations--states, enterprises, NGOs, and other sorts of organized human collectives. 

The G7--both in its meeting and written memorialization of those inter-personal encounters (formal and informal)--suggests one of the forms of official agit-prop that now serves as the means through which transaction-based (e.g., here, here) encounters between formal and informal actors, each constituted as the expression of political. social, economic, and cultural power. There is nothing historically unique about this meeting of the G7 in terms of its performance and communication form, broadly understood. Sometimes the agit prop sounded in opera; sometimes in musical comedy; and sometimes in avant garde absurdist theater (Absurdist in its more ancient sense as something discordant and therefore incapable of being heard in a meaningful way). President Trump appears to add, in the view of some it appears, a measure of theatricality that moves the production from high society theater to vaudeville somewhere in the early 20th Century Bowery. district of New York. That adds to the fun. 

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The agit-prop was delightfully press worthy, and constructed for easy transposition to the social media organs  which serve as the virtual theatre space in which agit-prop is performed. And every theatre piece has a set if principal actors, in this case around the President of the United States.  President Trump was up to the task: arriving onstage to a Greek chorus style set piece, making press worthy declarations about the way that history ought to be written, and of the role of Russia within the Group. Russia's tragedy was a worthy sub-text to this overall cavalcade of cacophony adding a musical element to the proceedings--and aided by the rest of the theatre troupe for the entertainment of their audience and amplified by the media "stage hands" that bring these set pieces to life (eg here). 

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That last bit added a bit of hilarity to the early (first act) of the G7 meeting (in the sense of its Roman celebrations of Hilaria, "times of pomp and rejoicing; there were public ones in honor of Cybele at the spring equinoxes as well as private ones on the day of a marriage or a son's birth." (here):President Trump's lamentation about Russia being booted out of the then G8 which caused great sadness; less perhaps than the invasion and annexation of Crimea, and other portions of Ukraine and Georgia, etc. An excellent piece of agit-prop that served both to teach and provoke. There was more of course--the Real Housewives of New Jersey analysis of interpersonal relationships, capped by a bit of drama, the quick exit of President Trump to attend top weightier matters shortly after he arrived (here). There was more, of course--the fight over whether there was agreement about Ukraine (hardly likely given President Trump's lamentation of President Putin's melancholia for his post annexation removal from the G8, now G7 (here), bit see here in another moment of theater). 

The agit-prop of this meeting of the G7, though, was also manifested in text. That text, the G7 Leaders’ statement on recent developments between Israel and Iran(16 June 2025) managed to combine both a bricolage of multi-vector bromides that appear to sell to factional intelligentsia that appear to dominate  G7 national "brain trusts" and the expectations of a news oriented social media with its own expectations of how "leader speak" ought to be scripted. Here is the text: 

G7 Leaders’ statement on recent developments between Israel and Iran
June 16, 2025 Kananaskis, Alberta

We, the leaders of the G7, reiterate our commitment to peace and stability in the Middle East.
In this context, we affirm that Israel has a right to defend itself. We reiterate our support for the security of Israel.
We also affirm the importance of the protection of civilians.
Iran is the principal source of regional instability and terror.
We have been consistently clear that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.
We urge that the resolution of the Iranian crisis leads to a broader de-escalation of hostilities in the Middle East, including a ceasefire in Gaza.
We will remain vigilant to the implications for international energy markets and stand ready to coordinate, including with like-minded partners, to safeguard market stability.

On its face there is nothing objectionable about any single statement in the text.  Indeed, each, singly, expresses some of the highest aspirations of humanity in this current stage of its historical development. The problem, of course, is that those statements can exist in all of their beauty only when they do not come directly in contact with each other.  But everyone who reads it implicitly believes, or is invited to believe in the solidarity of the text as a whole, made rational by their own engagement with text (here). At the same time, the text can be seen to serve as a curtain behind which those who embrace it can choose to order text in any way that serves their interests. Like the keys to a badly tuned piano they can be played in any order and combination in one note or in sequences that  reflect the inner demons of those at the keyboard.

Nonetheless, the G7 Statement invites us to hold fast to the text, even if each of their parts cannot yet come into proximity with any of the others. Perhaps some day they will; but it will be within an ordered reality that for us in the present remains substantially unimaginable--understood in its semiotic sense.  

Just Published: International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique Vol 38 Issue 5

 

 Delighted to pass along the announcement fo the publication of Volume 38 Issue 5 of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique. Yhe issue includes 15 quite interesting articles that span the length and breadth of legal semiotics.

The table of contents with links to the articles follows below. 

 

President Donald Trump’s Full Remarks at the 250th Anniversary of the US Army Grand Military Parade June 14, 2025, the "No Kings" Response, and Political Communication as Agit-Prop

 

There was much political commotion around the address President Trump was to make at a Military Parade organized for that purpose to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Army on a day that coincided with the presidential birthday.   The Video of the remarks: President Donald Trump’s Full Remarks at the 250th Anniversary of the US Army Grand Military Parade (June 14, 2025) were posted to the White House Website. The speech itself was what one might expect on so august an occasion; that is there were no surprises but a thoughtful expression of recognition in the now well known style of President Trump. A transcript follows below with thanks to the web site Roll Call from which it is sourced.

The President celebrated the parade in person and in text, memorials to both of which were inserted into the White House Website in "President Trump Celebrates U.S. Army’s 250th Birthday with Iconic Grand Parade" the text of which follows below. The pictures of the event were especially evocative.

As President Trump said in his remarks: “Tonight, we affirm with unwavering certainty that in the years ahead, and in every generation hence, whenever duty calls and whatever danger comes, the American Soldier will be there. No matter the risks, no matter the obstacles, our warriors will charge into battle, they will plunge into the crucible of fire, and they will seize the crown of victory because the United States of America will always have the grace of Almighty God and the iron will of the United States Army.” ("President Trump Celebrates U.S. Army’s 250th Birthday with Iconic Grand Parade" )

More interesting politically, as one might expect in these times, and certainly now traditional after 2016, also organized around both events were a series of popular manifestation framed under the theme--"No Kings." As reported by the Associated Press, with lots of photos, 

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Demonstrators gathered in parks and plazas across the U.S. to protest against President Donald Trump. The “No Kings” rallies were organized in nearly 2,000 locations nationwide, including cities, towns, and community spaces. These protests followed recent unrest over federal immigration raids and Trump’s deployment of the National Guard and Marines to Los Angeles, where tensions escalated with protesters blocking a freeway and setting vehicles on fire.

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And, indeed, as NPR appeared to suggest, the principle value of "No Kings" (other than perhaps for their participants  whose objectives they are in the best position to articulate,  was to produce images. (The Picture Show; Photos: See No Kings protests around the country). Agit-prop (agitation-propaganda with its origins in the 1920s in Western Europe and with a Soviet aspect as well but then sometimes detached from a particular ideological positioning)) remains both a powerful visual tool and a preferred tool for leveraging culture and media technologies to advance political, social, cultural objectives within liberal democratic states. Imagery and performance rather than text and argument, now shape the narratives within which it is possible to believe, and from belief to understand, a world around one in a way that aligns belief with the performance of the act of believing in a thing. This is as much embedded in  the popular manifestations of people as it is in more organized parades. Both tell one more about the state of performing belief than they do about the things shaped by that belief--not text, theater.

One might well wonder whether, given the state of contemporary culture, the most effective forms of political communication are now only effective when projected in the forms and with the sensibilities of agit-prop. There are interesting potential consequences that might be worth considering. Among these are what that turn to agit-prop as discourse might potentially negatively impact the now almost century old inculcation of narratives of "brain trust" governance, experts and fact driven techno-bureaucratic managerialism that appears, just recently to be approaching a climatic (and transformative) moment. Another focuses on the performance of politics through mass manifestations; where decisive communication may turn on the strength, and vigor, of mass mobilizations on the street, the forms and nature of speech and speech acts, and their consequences may change dramatically, and intensely. And yet another, and broader element worth considering are the way that agit-prop may reshape the relationship between popular manifestations and the institutional apparatus of political authority. Lastly, agit-prop as an instrument of institutionalized authority also has a significant effect on that authority and on the institutions for the control and management of which it may be deployed.  This is not to suggest much of anything pointed to the resolution or preferences in this current state of the American national condition--that I leave to others.  It is, however, to note that agit-prop as an instrument does not have a political ideology, but if done well does have an interesting potential effect on the institutionalization of power in liberal democratic states. 

A video of the President's remarks may also be accessed HERE. 

Announcing Publication of Article : "Cuba and the Constitution of a Stable State of Misery: Ideology, Economic Policy, and Popular Discipline" [Cuba y la Constitución de un Estado Estable de Miseria: Ideología, Política Económica y Disciplina Popular] (2025) 13(2) Penn State J L Int'l Aff 1-84

 

I am delighted to announce the publication of Volume 13 Issue 2 of the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affair, of which I am a member of the faculty editorial board.

There are a number of quite interesting articles in this issues. Doron Narotzki (University of Akron) writes on tax treaties, and Noam Zamir (City  University of Hing Kong) writes on the evolution of international law in the course of civil and colonial wars. Also published were outstanding student comments, including Aubrey Fleming  on privacy protection for genetic information; Kylie Johnson on the Berne Convention and copyright infringement damages; and Shelby Jones on sex offender prison treatment. Earlier version was first presented at the Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, October 2024.

Also among them is my article, "Cuba and the Constitution of a Stable State of Misery: Ideology, Economic Policy, and Popular Discipline" (2025) 13(2) Penn State J L Int'l Aff 1-84. Great thanks to Hannah Katz, Managing Editor of Articles of JLIA  and the rest of the team for making this possible; a great group to work with! 

Here is its abstract and table of contents (divided into twelve vignettes) in English and Spanish:

The general default position of much commentary on the State of Cuba’s political model tends to be premised on an assumption of instability in need of repair. For decades some of the most creative minds on the planet have devoted tremendous amount of creative capital on solutions to the Cuban problem. This contribution suggests that what appears to be a state of instability and flux is actually becoming a stable state of misery. That stable state, in turn, suggests that control can be maintained as much on the basis of a premise of prosperity as it can on the basis of a reality of misery just challenging enough to keep a population really well managed and the political system reasonably well ordered. It is to consideration of hints about the nature and character of this stable state that this essay is directed. These hints are organized in three parts. The first, the ideological element, considers the way that that morality of consumerism developed over the decades by Fidel Castro and incorporated into the organic documents of the Cuban political economic model helped shape an approach to the role of material goods in a “revolutionary” society in ways that made collective misery—at some level—both tolerable and strategically useful. The second looks to the political-economic element. That is, it considers the ways in which the underlying consumerist morality of the political-economic model finds expression in the practices and policies of the State apparatus guided by the Party and its own governance apparatus. The contribution considers this from the interests of three significant groups with substantial engagement with Cuba. The first include states and other foreign lenders. The second includes the apparatus of the Cuban state itself and the elaboration of a dual character economy. And the third touches on Cuba’s projection into the world, especially in the shadow of its quite useful relationship with the United States. The third then considers the utility of periodic popular explosion as the disciplinary factor for gauging the limits of misery tolerable by the body politic. This inverts the usual discourse of popular protest as a means of governance rather than in its more usual construction as some sort of pre-revolutionary signaling of the end of the current hegemony of the political-economic model that has shaped Cuban governance since the mid-1970s.

 Table of Contents:
1. Introduction
2. The Ideological Element
2.1 Vignette 1: Fidel’s Refrigerators.
2.2 Vignette 2: The State Ideology in the Shadow of Consumption and Globalization.
2.3 Vignette 3: Fidel’s “Children” and the Institutionalization of Ideologies of Misery.
3. The Political-Economic Element
3.1 Vignette 4: The Phoenix of Stability From Out of Disaster.
3.2 Vignette 5: The Governance of Misery.
3.3 Vignette 6: Welcome to the Hunger Games and Global Lenders.
3.4 Vignette 7: The Hunger Games Part 2—The Spy-Friends Edition. 
3.5 Vignette 8: The Hunger Games Part 3—The ‘You’ve Got a Friend in Me’ Edition.
4. Popular explosion as the Disciplinary Factor
4.1 Vignette 9: The Edges of Misery and the Misery of the Edges-11 July 2021.
4.2 Vignette 10; Even Protests Can be a Leninist Instrument.
4.3 Vignette 11: The Toleration f the Intolerable and the Search for a Stable State.
4.4 Vignette 12: The Swingling Pendulum.
5. Conclusion 

Cuba y la Constitución de un Estado Estable de Miseria: Ideología, Política Económica y Disciplina Popular

Resumen: La postura general de muchos comentarios sobre el estado del modelo político cubano tiende a basarse en el supuesto de una inestabilidad temporal que requiere reparación. Durante décadas, algunas de las mentes más creativas del planeta han dedicado una enorme cantidad de capital creativo a buscar soluciones para el problema cubano. Esta contribución sugiere que lo que parece ser un estado temporal de inestabilidad y fluctuación se está convirtiendo en un estado estable de miseria. Ese estado estable, a su vez, sugiere que el control puede mantenerse tanto con base en la prosperidad básica como en una realidad de miseria lo suficientemente desafiante como para mantener una población bien gestionada y un sistema político razonablemente bien organizado. Este artículo examina los acontecimientos recientes en Cuba en busca de indicios sobre la naturaleza y el carácter de este estado estable. Estos indicios se organizan en tres partes. Primero, el elemento ideológico, considera la moralidad del consumismo. Este marco conceptual, desarrollado a lo largo de décadas por Fidel Castro e incorporado a los documentos orgánicos del modelo político-económico cubano, contribuyó a definir un enfoque sobre el papel de los bienes materiales en una sociedad "revolucionaria", de manera que la miseria colectiva, en cierto grado, fuera tolerable y estratégicamente útil. El segundo aborda el elemento político-económico. Es decir, considera cómo la moral consumista subyacente del modelo político-económico se expresa en las prácticas y políticas del aparato estatal, guiado por el Partido Comunista y su propio aparato de gobierno. La contribución considera esto desde los intereses de tres grupos significativos con un compromiso sustancial con Cuba. Uno incluye a los estados y otros prestamistas extranjeros. Otro incluye el propio aparato estatal cubano y la elaboración de una economía de doble carácter. Y el último aborda la gestión de la narrativa de masas a través de la proyección de Cuba al mundo, especialmente a la sombra de su muy útil relación con Estados Unidos. El tercero, a su vez, considera la utilidad de la explosión popular periódica como factor disciplinario para medir los límites de la miseria tolerable para el pueblo cubano. Esto invierte el discurso habitual de la protesta popular como medio de gobernanza, en lugar de su interpretación más habitual como una especie de señal prerrevolucionaria del fin de la hegemonía actual del modelo político-económico que ha moldeado la gobernanza cubana desde mediados de la década de 1970.

Índice:
1. Introducción
2. El elemento ideológico
2.1 Viñeta 1: Los refrigeradores de Fidel.
2.2 Viñeta 2: La ideología de Estado a la sombra del consumo y la globalización.
2.3 Viñeta 3: Los “hijos” de Fidel y la institucionalización de las ideologías de la miseria.
3. El elemento político-económico
3.1 Viñeta 4: El fénix de la estabilidad surgido del desastre.
3.2 Viñeta 5: La gobernanza de la miseria.
3.3 Viñeta 6: Bienvenidos a los Juegos del Hambre y a los prestamistas globales. 3.4 Viñeta 7: Los Juegos del Hambre Parte 2: La Edición de los Amigos Espías.
3.5 Viñeta 8: Los Juegos del Hambre Parte 3: La Edición «Tienes un amigo en mí».
4. La explosión popular como factor disciplinario.
4.1 Viñeta 9: Los límites de la miseria y la miseria de los límites - 11 de julio de 2021.
4.2 Viñeta 10: Incluso las protestas pueden ser un instrumento leninista.
4.3 Viñeta 11: La tolerancia de lo intolerable y la búsqueda de un estado estable.
4.4 Viñeta 12: El péndulo oscilante.
5. Conclusión

The full essay may be downloaded from the   Penn State Journal of Law & International Affair  website. Direct link HERE: Cuba and the Constitution of a Stable State of Misery: Ideology, Economic Policy, and Popular Discipline. I post here the Introduction below. The last draft is also available on SSRN.

The Spanish language version of the introcuction also follows below.

Workshop Presentation: "Trump's America: Issues, Conflicts, and Future Trajectories"

 

Was invited to participate in a workshop for members of a European political party discussing my perspectives on the 2nd Administration of President Trump. The questions revolved around the genesis of the Trump "phenomenon" and the competing visions going forward--drawing lessons  either for those interested in engaging with the Administration, or their political opposition, or for any consequences for their own national political life. The conversation was rich. I include here the PPT I used to set the mood.

 

Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (N.D.Cal.)--Part 2; Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order; Order Granting Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order; Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for Stay Pending Appeal; Order Granting Emergency Motion

 

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In  Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California) Filed 10 June 2025--Part I I considered the initial skirmish in the battle between Governor Newsom and President Trump, each in a sense representing a quite distinct vision of the nature and form of political organization and behaviors in the Republic. The focus was on the initial complaint filed by Governor Newsom  against President Trump. 

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The battle politics is, appropriately enough, Presidential (and federal) power over migration. The battlefield is Los Angeles, mass protests (with the usual violence at its edges, and the even more usual infiltration of mass protests with a variety of elements disunited in purpose and tactics). Beyond the space of protest, and violence, is violence of a different sport. On the one hand there is that of state and local officials who appear less than enthusiastic about the enforcement of law; on the other are national officials whose enthusiasm for enforcement may cross legal lines. The battle weapons that are emerging in the legalization of this political fight in its contemporary form are those of intent (in the form of abuse of discretion); a narrow interpretive textualism (once the reserve of conservative or traditionalist jurisprudence), and state's rights. 

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That last weapon, states rights, now adds irony to the list of the transformations of the Republic's political conversations  in the second quarter of this century. At the same time it replays an ancient conversation around the division of authority between States and the federal government that recall, when it was last an issue, the great battles between States intent on preserving local control of desegregation, and a federal government intent on facilitating a national objective to move forward on integration. It is in this sense instructive to reconsider  (1958) Orval E. Faubus, “Speech on School Integration”, not for its politics, but for its political theory--one that was  consigned to the trash heap of bad jurisprudence  and now resurrected in the service of a politics which has found refuge (again) in the states. 

It also reprises a debate about the reach of the 10th Amendment to the federal constitution (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”), which had been relegated to yet another jurisprudential trash bin in the 1940s ( United States v. Darby (1941); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority), resurrected at least at the margins during the first conservative battles of the 1980s-90s (South Dakota v. Dole (1987); New York v. United States (1992); Printz v. United States (1997)), and d now brought into play by States and other actors who find in that Amendment's penumbra's protection for State power that their ancestors rejected in the euphoria of national integration after 1945. 

Irony; but a reminder that jurisprudential tools have no ideological master--and that what was once a jurisprudential anathema can be resurrected and applied to undo what had earlier been done.  Of course, that suggests a political element to constitutional jurisprudence; see here and here). All of this is on view in this litigation. 

In response to the initial action filed by Governor Newsom, the Trump Administration filed their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, a document of about 32 pages that may be accessed HERE. Its essential argument was this:

 On the merits, Plaintiffs’ claims are baseless. The President properly invoked his statutory
authority to federalize the California National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406. Plaintiffs admit that Los Angeles has experienced “unrest,” but ask this Court to second-guess the President’s judgment that federal reinforcements were necessary. That is precisely the type of sensitive judgment that is committed to the President’s discretion by law, and to which courts owe the highest deference. The statute empowers the President to determine what forces “he considers necessary” to “suppress” a “rebellion” or to “execute” federal “laws”—not the Governor, and not a federal court. Plaintiffs also object that the President did not consult with, or obtain the consent of, the Governor, but the statute imposes no such requirement. It merely directs, as a procedural matter, that the President’s orders be conveyed “through” the Governor. They were.
Plaintiffs’ objection based on the Posse Comitatus Act is equally misdirected. Neither the
National Guard nor the Marines are engaged in law enforcement. Rather, they are protecting law enforcement, consistent with longstanding practice and the inherent protective power to provide for the safety of federal property and personnel. Plaintiffs offer no contrary evidence, only a speculative assertion that the National Guard and Marines will be used for unlawful purposes in the future. That speculation cannot justify the extraordinary remedy they seek. (Defendant's Opposition. p. 2). 

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Particularly interesting was  the invocation by President Trump's legal team of the imageries of Orvel Faubus and the segregationist take on states rights and the use of federal forces. "In short, Section 12406 affords no veto to Governor Newsom over the President's decision
to call forth the guard, just as it afforded no veto to Governor Faubus when President Eisenhower
last invoked the predecessor to Section 12406 to ensure that the enforcement of federal law was
not obstructed." (Defendant's Opposition, p. 22).

The District Court was not impressed.  The judge rejected thus framing in favor of another narrative, one that has been cultivated by the President's opponents (fair game in politics of course, especially in a Republic notorious for constructing narratives to suit contemporary politics, but that is also fair game). In this sense the Trump Administration's characterization of Governor Newsom's complaint as "crass political stunt endangering American lives”(Ibid., p. 1) was both a plausible characterization and irrelevant given the long history of such "stunts" that dotted the American judicial landscape, most notoriously perhaps, from President Truman's perspective (and the lives lost in consequence in order to serve the purity of our jurisprudence--a hard but defensible position), in the case that announced the current Supreme Court position on the standards for interpreting the limits of the power of the Executive and the management of separation of power in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 

The judge's perspective was made clear at the hearing:

The judge repeatedly emphasized that Trump is exercising presidential authority — not a king’s — and the role comes with limitations. “That’s the difference between a constitutional government and King George,” Breyer said. “It’s not that a leader can simply say something and then it becomes it. It’s a question of is a leader, a president or the governor, following the law as set forth in both the Constitution and statutes,” he continued. “That’s what a president, a governor or any leader must act under. Otherwise, they become something other than a constitutional officer.” (Judge invokes monarchy talk while mulling Trump’s National Guard deployment).

Judge Breyer's decision rejected the Trump Administration's position. In his Order Granting Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order . It concluded by rejecting the Administration's arguments, interpreting key terms (e.g., rebellion, and "through the Governor") against Defendants and concluding that the balance of equities favor the Governor:

Federal agents and property may actually well be served by de-militarization and a concurring de-escalation of the situation. Regardless, Plaintiffs and the citizens of Los Angeles face a greater harm from the continued unlawful militarization of their city, which not only inflames tensions with protesters, threatening increased hostilities and loss of life, but deprives the state for two months of its own use of thousands of National Guard members to fight fires, combat the fentanyl trade, and perform other critical functions. As discussed above, Defendants’ actions also threaten to chill legitimate First Amendment expression. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the balance of equities tips in their favor and that an injunction restraining the President’s use of military force in Los Angeles is in the public interest. (Order p. 35).

The order was stayed until 13 June. 

In the meantime, the Trump Administration filed a 324 page appeal to the 9th Circuit (EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER CIRCUIT RULE 27-3 FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL. It consisted of 22 pages of argument and the record below.

A critical element among others in the Emergency Motion focused on the meaning of the ·through the governor" language and the extent to which it requires consent rather than notice. The arguments made by the Trump Administration in its Emergency Motion follow below.

That Emergency Motion was granted. "The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted an emergency stay, temporarily suspending Breyer’s court order and allowing the federal government to maintain control of the California National Guard through at least June 17th." (Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s Seizure of California National Guard; see also HERE). 

Stay tuned for Part 3. 

 

 Access 

Part 1: Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California) Filed 10 June 2025--Part I

Part 2:  Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (N.D.Cal.)--Part 2; Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order; Order Granting Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order; Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for Stay Pending Appeal; Order Granting Emergency Motion

Part 3: Newsom v. Trump NO. 3:25-cv-04870-CRB (N.D.Cal.)--Part 3; Oral Argument Before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

America First: Globalization as the Systematization of Ordered Anarchy Philosophizing With a Hammer--Statement from Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Israeli Actions Against Iran

 

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On 12 June 2025, the White House Website posted a short Statement of Secretary Marco Rubio. It read in full as follows:

“Tonight, Israel took unilateral action against Iran. We are not involved in strikes against Iran and our top priority is protecting American forces in the region. Israel advised us that they believe this action was necessary for its self-defense. President Trump and the Administration have taken all necessary steps to protect our forces and remain in close contact with our regional partners. Let me be clear: Iran should not target U.S. interests or personnel.”

There was a time when it was fashionable to criticize globalization as producing a state of anarchy distasteful to those who argued from this perspective (see, e.g. here "If anarchy constitutes the absence of government, this aspect of globalization might seem to be a move toward a special kind of anarchy ‑‑ what may be called anarchism for the rich and powerful").  The critique was sound within the first principles from out of which it proceeded. 

I have suggested that this approach, while compatible with the ruling ideology challenged by globalization's phenomenology through the emergence of COVID in 2020, may miss in part both the nature of anarchy and its presence in constructing the post-global from out of its various critiques and contradictions (The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity). I then noted that emerging structures power/governance could be better understood "as the systematization of anarchy [order without hierarchies of control]. . .  [rather than] chaos [the absence of ordering structures/principles and] of the converse of archê [a unifying first principle around which convergence may be ordered], . . . Global law posits a system uncomfortable with first causes and without singular objective, a system grounded in an-­‐archê of dispersion and of purpose; “Nothing has any meaning”, the essence of the market."  (Ibid., pp. 180-181). It is in this sense that one can now understand anarchy in the way that one understands the internal workings of markets, and the win-win strategies of the U.S. and China--"Here also is rejection of the utility of traditional anarchism that speaks to anarchy as order without power. See. Rather I am suggesting order and power without a controlling superstructure in the state system."

Secretary Rubio's Statement quite nicely provides an illustration of these structuring ideas in action. Its brevity belies the complexities of the description of the essence of the new global ordering grounded, as appropriate for merchant thinking--of a markets driven politics. The United States was aware of the Israeli action; it might have even tacitly indicated that the action did not affect U.S. interests adversely. But it also indicated that the United States saw this as a local matter, one that would have collateral effects--in this case on the U.S. negotiations with Iran on nuclear weapons. In this case two merchants with two distinct market objectives--one regional and national security, and the other more broadly concerned with constellations of weapons arsenals that could, eventually to used to harm their own interests--found a convergence of interests that opened a space for individual action. Partners are not principles; and partnerships do not necessarily suggest control relations.  This is a quite distinct approach to that of prior administrations, in which partnership also suggested the sort of closer control of a patron and their clients. Whether or not this can be elaborated to a framework for a working style remains to be seen, but at least its skeleton is now visible in action. 

That skeleton is essentially a manifestation of systemic anarchy--but it does not suggest chaos. It is rooted in order but one that emerges upward rather than drips downward. This is precisely the sort of phenomenology of America First that, whether or not the rhetoric of America First survives this Administration, may stay with the Republic for some time to come.  States have, indeed, and finally, realized their alignment with markets and market behaviors--in this case the markets for sovereign authority and advantage grounded in the nature of the benefits that each market actor can deliver to its consumers. What has become objectified, and commodified, is the value that a State can deliver--to other States (traditionally), but into and to the masses that consume and internalize the products on offer. 

This illustrates, again, the phenomenology of the merchant philosophizing with a hammer (pithy Cf here):

 Now, the next test--can these principles be applied to the more troublesome relations between the United States and Ukraine--there the Trump Administration does not practice what its actions elsewhere preach. 

Enrique Dussel Peters (ed), "Latin American Exports to China: Local experiences and Challenges" (Unión de Universidades de América Latina y el Caribe, 2025)

 

 

Happy to pass along the announcement by Enrique Dussel Peters (Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM); Coordinator, Center for Chinese-Mexican Studies (Cechimex), School of Economics, UNAM; Coordinator, Academic Network for Latin America and the Caribbean on China (Red ALC-China) of the book: Enrique Dussel Peters (ed), Latin American Exports to China: Local experiences and Challenges (Unión de Universidades de América Latina y el Caribe, 2025).

The collection of essays edited by Prof.Dussel Peters include chapters on  

1. Chinese Value-Added in Latin American and Caribbean Exports. Conditions and Challenges (by Enrique Dussel Peters and Lesbis Pérez-Santillán), 

2. Local Impact of Venezuela´s Oil Exports to China. An Analysis Based on the New Oil-Based Global Value Chain (2000-2023) (by Carlos Eduardo Piña), 

3. Impacts of Chilean Exports to China of the Cherry Global Value Chain (by Dorotea López, Andrés Bórquez and Juan E. Serrano-Moreno), 

4. Brazil-China Oil Relationship. Impacts from a Local Perspective (by Pedro Henrique Batista Barbosa), 

5. Argentine Soybean Exports to China. Myths and Realities in the Pampas Region (by Eduardo Daniel Oviedo), 

6. Territorial Impacts of Exports Copper from Peru to China (by Kehan Wang and Marco Curi), and 

7. Territorial Impacts of Ecuadorian Shrimp Exports to China (by Carolina Viola-Reyes and Giuliana Vera-Díaz).

The "Presentation" authored by Enrique Dussel Peters follows. The work may be accessed HERE.

 

OMFIF and CPP Investments Institute June 2025 Report: "Investing in a Changing World: How Public Funds are Addressing Climate Related Physical Risks"

 

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 Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF),  an independent forum for central banking, economic policy and public investment, along with CPP Investments Institute, a part of CPP Investment, a global investment management organization managing the Canada Pension Plan, have announced the distribution of its June 2025 Report: "Investing in a Changing World: How Public Funds are Addressing Climate Related Physical Risks."

In its Media Release, they explain its purpose as follows:

This paper outlines how five leading public investment funds—defined here as long-term, government-backed institutional investors, including public pension funds and sovereign wealth funds—are beginning to integrate physical risk into their investment processes. These funds, collectively managing approximately US$2.7 trillion in assets, shared insights on the various barriers they face, the data they currently use, and the lessons they’ve learned. The result is an early, consolidated view of emerging approaches to physical risk integration—not a single case study, but an amalgamated perspective on what will be required to better mitigate risk.

To be clear, this paper represents a snapshot in time. Investors’ understanding of the portfolio implications of physical risk is advancing quickly, as are the techniques and technologies for managing it. Five years from now, the approaches of these institutions will likely look very different.

Nevertheless, for investors, an understanding of where things stand today is an essential first step toward building more resilient investment strategies. For companies, the same insights can serve as a market signal—clarifying what’s required to enhance long-term investability and attract capital.

The quite detailed text of the Media Release which includes much of the text of the Report (A Turning Point: Why physical risk now demands investor attention; Stalling momentum on the climate transition is drawing greater investor attention to physical risk) follows below. The full Report may be accessed HERE. 

 A few highlights are worth mention.

1. Defining risk in climate related activity: 

The public funds we spoke to defined physical risk as the potential for financial loss due to climate-related events. It can be divided into two categories: chronic risks, which develop gradually over time (such as rising sea levels or increasing temperatures), and acute risks, which result from extreme weather events like floods, wildfires, or hurricanes. (Report at p. 3).

It may be important to remember that risk, in whatever form, measured as a function of financial loss, can be approached from a variety of angles.  The first is a function of prioritizing one of prevention, mitigation or remediation strategies, though risk response will likely include all three elements. Their transposition into analytics---that is the weight each carries in analysis--will likely vary widely. The second is that economic loss from chronic or acute risk is well established in business and finance operation--what is added here are the ways in which these risks can be quantified in the context of climate. That is, in some respects not an easy task and is itself subject to data risk (quality and robustness risks) and analytical risk (the models ca be wrong, the analytics can be corrupted or they do not change with changing patterns that are indicated by the data.  Thurs, risk is related to Fund performance; some funds will measure that value quite differently, but it is important ot remember that the object is fund performance in the face of risk, mediated, to some extent, by the public policy and political mandates under which a fund operates. 

2.  Assessments Methods

Public funds employ a variety of methods to assess physical risks, blending top-down macroeconomic analysis with bottom-up asset-level evaluations. One common approach among the funds interviewed is the use of scenario analysis to understand potential impacts and asset exposure under different climate trajectories. (Report, p. 4).

Analytics are central to the risk response strategies adopted (again as a function of national objectives and political directives). Though scenario planning is popular, and useful, it is also suggested that there is a movement toward more comprehensive predictive analytics models. That, in turn, will require a substantial investment in data, tech (computing power), analytic rigor, and most likely the use of generative artificial intelligence in some ways. Yet, moving toward both predictive models and AI enhanced analytics produces its own risk and limitation (though legal standards, tech limits, and the determination of the autonomy if risk assessment from the human element. This is especially the case with data--where the analytics can be programmed to choose (and change) its own data, quality control and oversight issues will have to be considered.

3. Barriers to integration

A primary challenge in integrating risk is data availability and robustness, especially for assets where location-specific data are often limited. Many models struggle with accurately capturing the financial materiality of assets, especially in regions or sectors where risks are poorly understood or underpriced. (Report, p. 5)

The Report here aligns the challenges of conceptualization, analytics (capacity and robustness) with the core problematic of data. Again, the focus determines  the scope of data (in this case some sort of space where economic conformance and public policy objectives meet for each fund).  This generates an additional problem--where data sources differ (as they  must) to suit the needs of a Fund, comparability and transposability become problematic at best. This is a problem for the future, though one that is already emerging for those interested either in climate related compliance, or in comparison of Fund performance. In addition, the basic challenges of data remain--accessibility, robustness, consistency over time, warehousing, and the construction of data production in ways that make them useful. The Report usefully notes the data challenges especially for chronic risks, especially where the nature of a risk is not known until well after the initial (and perhaps critical) events happened when data retrieval becomes more challenging 

Report p. 7

4. Mitigation Strategies

To overcome these challenges, funds are expanding their analysis of physical risks, particularly for listed equities and corporate bonds, despite the limitations in data. Some funds are investing in new geospatial and satellite-based climate risk analytics to improve the granularity of location-specific risk assessments. Others are integrating catastrophe modelling frameworks to refine their predictions of extreme weather events and their financial impacts. A fund from Asia Pacific said, ‘We are actively trialling catastrophe risk models to bridge the gap in severity forecasting and better quantify asset-level exposures.’(Report, p. 6)

 One does what one can; and what all firms engaged in risk assessment functions tend to do is to develop necessary work-arounds, to buy or rent data or analytics, and to develop virtual or comparable risk assessment strategies. The latter, of course, is already built into the conceptual foundations of scenario planning--an invitation, at a higher level of application, to the construction of simulation--including simulated data. That, in turn, can be compared to what data is available to either fill in holes or to suggest risk pathways. One can on this way  avoid or mitigate data and analytics issues. But of course, simulacra are only as good as their analytic universe and the plausibility of data building blocks. 

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5. Value creation opportunities in physical risk resilience

Beyond risk mitigation, improving resilience presents material value-creation opportunities. Some funds see adaptation solutions as an investment opportunity, with climate resilience-focused sectors such as flood protection infrastructure, wildfire-resistant real estate, and coastal defence systems becoming increasingly attractive. (Report, p. 7).

And there it is--risk assumes a meaningful form only as a function of los, and loss assumes a form only in relation to the transactions, actions, or changes that are meaningful to the person adversely affected (as they come to understand the notion of adverse change). One needs to create value.  But both the concepts of value and of creation may vary widely. Fracture, then, appears to be the fundamental conclusion of the Report, though not a chaotic one--an anarchic one, one which still revolves around risk, value, and climate, but with respect to which divergence is likely though order around the animating concepts remains steady.